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FEDERAL JURISDICTION-In the Absence of Bad Faith
Harassment by State Authorities, the Mere Showing of a
Chilling Effect on First Amendment Freedoms Held Insufficient to Warrant a Federal Injunction Staying State Criminal Proceedings.
John Harris, Jr. was indicted in a California state court for an alleged violation of the California Criminal Syndicalism Statute.' The
alleged illegal activity consisted of the distribution of leaflets advocating change in industrial ownership through Socialist reform. After an
unsuccessful interlocutory appeal to the state appellate court, Harris
filed a complaint in a federal district court requesting injunctive relief
from further criminal proceedings in the California court.2 In his complaint, Harris alleged the unconstitutionality of the state statute on
1. § 11400. Definition. "Criminal syndicalism" as used in this article means any
doctrine or precept advocating, teaching or aiding and abetting the commission of
crime, sabotage (which word is hereby defined as meaning wilful and malicious
physical damage or injury to physical property), or unlawful acts of force and violence
or unlawful methods of terrorism as a means of accomplishing a change in industrial
ownership or control, or effecting any political change.
§ 11401. Offense; punishment. Any person who:
1. By spoken or written words or personal conduct advocates, teaches or aids and
abets criminal syndicalism or the duty, necessity or propriety of committing crime,
sabotage, violence or any unlawful method of terrorism as a means of accomplishing
a change in industrial ownership or control, or effecting any political change; or
2. Wilfully and deliberately by spoken or written words justifies or attempts to
justify criminal syndicalism or the commission or attempt to commit crime, sabotage,
violence or unlawful methods of terrorism with intent to approve, advocate or further
the doctrine of criminal syndicalism; or
3. Prints, publishes, edits, issues or circulates or publicly displays any book, paper,
pamphlet, document, poster or written or printed matter in any other form containing
or carrying written or printed advocacy, teaching, or aid and abetment of, or advising,
criminal syndicalism; or
4. Organizes or assists in organizing, or is or knowingly becomes a member of
any organization, society, group or assemblage of persons organized or assembled to
advocate, teach or aid and abet criminal syndicalism; or
5. Wilfully by personal act or conduct, practices or commits any act advised,
advocated, taught or aided and abetted by the doctrine or precept of criminal syndicalism, with intent to accomplish a change in industrial ownership or control, or
effecting any political change;
Is guilty of a felony and punishable by imprisonment in the state prison not less
than one nor more than 14 years.
2. In addition to Harris, Jim Dan and Diane Hirsh intervened as plaintiffs
claiming that the prosecution of Harris would inhibit them from peacefully exercising
their rights of free expression. Also Farrell Broslawski intervened claiming that the
prosecution of Harris made him uncertain whether he could teach Marxist doctrine in
his classroom. The Court refused to allow them to join in the suit because their
allegations were insufficient to warrant the exercise of federal equitable powers on their
behalf. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
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grounds of vagueness and overbreadth. In addition, Harris asked the
federal court to exercise its equitable powers and enjoin the state authorities from any further criminal action under the criminal indictment.
Harris claimed he would suffer irreparable injury because of the pending prosecution, and the inadequacies of any state legal remedies to
vindicate his first amendment rights.
A three judge federal district court 4 rejected the state prosecutor's
theory that injunctive relief would be barred by the Federal Anti-injunction Statute,5 and granted injunctive relief to Harris. 6 The court
held the state statute to be unconstitutional on its face, and saw no reason to abstain from issuing an injunction, pending state construction of
the challenged statute. Therefore, the district court issued the injunction.
The state prosecutor appealed directly to the Supreme Court of
the United States. 7 The state of California, on request of the Supreme
Court, filed an additional brief asserting the misapplication by the district court of the judicial exception to the national policy of federal non-interference with state criminal proceedings. The appellant
questioned the lower court's decision holding the state statute unconstitutional on its face.8
The Supreme Court reversed 9 the decision of the federal district
court, holding that its decision violated the national policy forbidding
federal courts to stay or enjoin pending state court proceedings except
under special circumstances. The Court found no such circumstances
existing in the case presented. The opinion of the Court, written by
Mr. Justice Black, and concurred in by the Chief Justice and Mr.
Justice Blackmun,10 attempted to clarify the position of the federal
3. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357 (1927), held the challenged statute constitutional. However, that decision was overruled in Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S.
444 (1969), when the Court held a similar Ohio statute unconstitutional. The Younger
Court did not decide the constitutionality of the California statute.
4. Convened pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2281 (1964).
5. 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1964): "A court of the United States may not grant an
injunction to stay proceedings in a State court except as expressly authorized by
Act of Congress, or where in necessary aid of its jurisdiction, or to protect or effectuate its judgments."
6. Harris v. Younger, 281 F. Supp. 507 (C.D. Cal., 1968).
7. 28 U.S.C. 1253 (1964).
8. See note 3, supra.
9. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
10. The concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Brennan, Mr. Justice White, and Mr.
Justice Marshall focuses exclusively on the issue of bad faith harassment by state
authorities. The concurring Justices joined in the result, and it should be noted that
they also support the thrust of the opinion of the Court, i.e. there must be a display of
some irreparable injury to the defendant before a federal court will enjoin a state
proceeding. Here the concurring opinion stated that the issues raised by Harris would
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courts and their interaction with state court criminal proceedings. The
factors the opinion gave special weight to included: the force and effect of the Anti-injunction Statute, the impact of Dombrowski v. Pfister" in providing an exception to the general rule of federal non-interference in this area, and the concept of federalism.
The Court also decided on the same day, that where injunctive relief
would not be granted, neither should a federal court grant a declaratory judgment construing a statute challenged in a state proceeding. 2
Both of these decisions have a substantial impact on the scope of federal judicial power over state court proceedings.
THE NON-INTERFERENCE

DOCTRINE AND THE

"SPECIAL CIRCUMSTANCES" EXCEPTION

The opinion of the Court in Younger can be viewed as a clarification of some of the questions that arose after the Dombrowski decision. In order to analyze the Younger Court's rationale, it is necessary
to explore the background of federal non-interference.
The lower federal courts in keeping with general concepts of federalism and states' rights have been very reluctant to interfere in the matters of the state judiciary. Beginning in the earliest stages of the nation's development, there has been support for the notion that state and
federal matters should be vigorously separated in the interest of efficiency and harmony.' 3 The Supreme Court stated this concept in
Railroad Commission v. Pullman Co.,"4 a case establishing the abstention doctrine, which is tangentially related to the non-interference policy involved in Younger. Referring to a line of cases refusing injunctive relief and restraining the federal courts from interfering in state
judicial matters,'" the Court said:
These cases reflect a doctrine of abstention appropriate to our federal system whereby the federal courts, "exercising a wise discrebe adequately adjudicated in the state court. Mr. Justice Harlan and Mr. Justice
Stewart also joined in the result. Their concurring opinion merely delineates those
issues left unresolved by the Court, namely, the decision the Court would make had
the Anti-injunction Statute not been in issue, and whether § 1983 provides a statutory
exception to § 2283. In sum, the majority of the Court supports the treatment of the
basic issues by the opinion of the Court, but various members have seen fit to clarify
details of the judgment.
11. 380 U.S.479 (1965).
12. Samuels v. Mackel, 401 U.S. 66 (1971).
13. See: Note, Abstention: An Exercise in Federalism, 108 U. PA. L. REV. 226
(1959); Consequences of Abstention by a Federal Court, 73 HARv. L. REV. 1358, 1368
(1960).
14. 312 U.S.496 (1941).
15. See: Pennsylvania v. Williams, 294 U.S. 176 (1935); Gilcrest v. Tuterborough
Co., 279 U.S. 159 (1928).
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tion," restrain their authority because of "scrupulous regard for the
rightful independence of the state governments" and for the smooth
working of the federal judiciary.' 6
The Court has always expressed the opinion that federal courts of equity
should avoid needless friction with state courts.'I
The theory that state courts will operate successfully without federal
intervention is reaffirmed by the opinion of the Court in Younger.
The opinion refers to Fenner v. Boykin' when stating the general rule
that there should be no interference with state officers in the area of
criminal prosecution. Nevertheless, federal courts have always allowed
for the extraordinary situation where non-interference would be improper.
Ex Parte Young' recognized a situation where federal intervention
becomes absolutely necessary to protect an individual's constitutional
rights. In such an unusual situation, federal courts may issue an injunction restraining a state officer. This judicial exception has evolved
very narrowly, and is subject to limited use. In order for a plaintiff to
secure federal injunctive relief from state proceedings he must show
'2
irreparable injury that is "both great and immediate.
The concept of federal non-interference is related to "comity," the
term used to describe federal respect for state capability and authority. "Comity" is reflected not only in case law, 2 ' but has been incorporated into statutory law in the form of the Anti-injunction Statute
(§ 2283). The effectiveness of this statute is the subject of some speculation.2 2 Congress began with the general rule, forbidding injunctions
staying state proceedings, then proceeded to include three broad exceptions. 8 In addition to the legislative exceptions, the existence of
special circumstances of the type referred to in Ex Parte Young has
served to invoke a judicially created exception to the Anti-injunction
16. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496, 501.
17. Speaking for the Court in the Younger case, J. Black summarized the general
approach of the federal judiciary to non-interference: "(T)he concept does represent
...a system in which there is sensitivity to the legitimate interest of both State and
National Governments, and in which the National Government, anxious though it may
be to vindicate and protect federal interests, always endeavors to do so in ways that will
not unduly interfere with the legitimate activities of the States." Younger v. Harris,
401 U.S. 37, 44 (1971). See also: Judicial Abstention from the Exercise of Federal
Jurisdiction, 59 COLUM. L. REV. 749 (1959).

18. 271 U.S. 240 (1926).
19. 209 U.S. 123 (1906).
20.

E.g. Id.

21. See: Darr v. Burford, 339 U.S. 200 (1950).
22. Sheridan v. Garrison, 415 F.2d 699 (5th Cir., 1970); cert. denied, 396 U.S.
1040 (1970); Machesky v. Bizzell, 414 F.2d 283 (5th Cir. 1969). See also: The
Federal Anti-injunction Statute and the Related Abstention Doctrine, 21 S.C.L. REV.

331 (1969).
23. 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1964), cited fully supra note 5.
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Statute. It is appropriate, therefore, to characterize the Anti-injunction
Statute as a reflection of national policy, giving the courts discretion in
its application. 24
A more restrictive view of the Anti-injunction Statute was stated in
Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers:
[A] federal court does not have inherent power to ignore the limitations of § 2283 and enjoin state court proceedings merely because
those proceedings interfere with a protected federal right or invade
an area pre-empted by federal law, even when the interference is
unmistakenly clear.2 5
The Court went on to say that when there is doubt as to the propriety of
federal intervention in state proceedings, the doubt should be resolved
in favor of allowing state activities to continue. Nevertheless, Atlantic
Coast does not rule out federal intervention when the extreme circumstances of irreparable harm are immediately endangering a criminal defendant.
Douglas v. City of Jeanette,26 a case often cited in support of decisions
withholding injunctive relief, serves to state the law prior to Dombrowski. In Douglas, the federal claimant was threatened with state prosecution for violation of a city ordinance prohibiting the solicitation of
orders for religious materials without a license. Alleging the ordinance to be unconstitutionally overbroad, the plaintiff requested an injunction barring any prosecutions which might be brought under it.
The plaintiff based his contention upon the fact that, due to the existence of the ordinance and the continued threats of prosecution, there
was an infringement of his rights of free expression. The Court refused to grant injunctive relief, stating that the harm plaintiff would
suffer was that incidental to every criminal prosecution.27 In the absence of irreparable harm, the plaintiff was left with his state court
remedies and ultimate Supreme Court review to vindicate his first
amendment rights.
The principle of Douglas has been widely followed, always allowing
for the extraordinary situation where federal relief would be granted.28
The factors that contribute to the existence of the "special circumstances" situation are carefully studied in each case where injunctive re24. See authorities cited supra note 22.
25. 398 U.S. 281 (1970). (It should be noted that Atlantic did not involve a state
statute alleged to be facially unconstitutional.) See generally: Comment, Injunctions
in Federal Courts, 46 NOTRE DAME LAWYER 616 (1971).
26. 319 U.S. 157 (1943).
27. Id.

28.

See: Trend in Federal-State Judicial Relations, 34 FoRD L. REv. 71 (1965).
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lief is requested. The federal courts have considered the constitutionality of the state statute in terms of overbreadth and vagueness,2"
the conduct of the state authorities, and the likelihood of multiple prosecutions directed at a lone defendant or group."0 The Court looked at
these factors in Younger and refused relief, although between Douglas
and Younger it reasoned sufficient special circumstances did exist in
Dombrowski to warrant the entry of an injunction.
Domb'rowski: AN

APPARENT EXPANSION OF

FEDERAL JURISDICTION

Dombrowski v. Pfister did not overrule any national policy of noninterference, but was decided on the basis of the line of authority allowing for federal intervention in "special circumstances."'" The decision in that case is an illustration of an extreme situation where the
federal courts were compelled to act to protect an individual's constitutional rights. The federal claimant, executive director of the Southern Conference Educational Fund (S.C.E.F.), was threatened with
prosecution due to alleged violations of the Louisiana Subversive Activities and Communist Control Law. In his complaint, the plaintiff contended that the threats of prosecution were part of a plan to harass his
organization, and that state authorities were guilty of bad faith by
carrying out seizures and arrests without hope of success. 2 Although
a three judge district court refused to issue an injunction restraining
the state prosecutor, 3 the Supreme Court reversed. The Court noted
that there was case authority supporting federal injunctive action upon
the showing of "special circumstances." The appellant in Dombrowski supported his burden of proof by showing: an overly broad state
statute, bad faith harassment by state officers, and the dangers of threatened criminal prosecution. All of the salient factors needed for federal
action were clearly present in Dombrowski. It should be noted that
since there was no state criminal proceeding pending, the Anti-injunc34
tion Statute was not an issue.
29. Overbreadth of a statute exists when a substantive right of an individual, protected by the Constitution, is diminished because the statute sanctions protected rights.
Vagueness exists when a statute is not subject to a clear meaning by persons of
common intelligence, e.g., Landry v. Daley, 280 F. Supp. 939 (N.D. Ill.
1968).
30. The risk of multiple prosecution has been equated with bad faith by state authorities. Roberts v. Clement, 252 F. Supp. 835 (E.D. Tenn. 1966).
31. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 50 (1971).
32. The extreme factual situation contributing to the special circumstances that ex-

isted in the Dombrowski case are collected at Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479,
487, n.4 (1965).
33. 227 F. Supp. 556 (E.D. La. 1964).
34. The Anti-injunction Statute expressly applies to only those situations where

state proceedings have begun. Cleary v. Bolger, 371 U.S. 392 (1962).
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The language in Dombrowski, however, has contributed to some of
the controversy surrounding this area of the law. The Court stated:
Because of the sensitive nature of constitutionally protected expression, we have not required that all of those subject to overbroad regulations risk prosecution to test their rights. For free expression-of transcendent value to all society,3 5and not merely to
those exercising their rights-might be the loser.
This language in the Dombrowski opinion has led some federal
courts to believe the decision authorizes federal courts to grant an injunction when a statute is justifiably attacked for overbreadth.3 6 Prior
decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court in the area of first amendment
freedoms also contributed to this result. In Baggett v. Bullitt,3 7 the
Court granted equitable relief in the form of a declaratory judgment to
a federal claimant who alleged he would suffer irreparable harm if he
were forced to comply with a state loyalty oath statute. Holding that
the required oath was vague and overly broad, the Court noted that abstention was discretionary and that when special circumstances arose
federal courts could decide issues ordinarily reserved for the state
courts.3 8 Baggett did not involve the federal policy against injunctions of state court proceedings, nevertheless, Baggett could be read as
limiting the proper sphere of federal court inaction where first amendment rights are involved.
Likewise, the Court held in McNeese v. Board of Education,3" that
the federal court's power is supplemental to the state's, and a claimant
has a right to have a federal court determine his rights with respect to
first amendment freedoms. Hence, McNeese stands for the proposition that it is unnecessary to exhaust state court remedies before requesting federal court assistance.
The troublesome language of the Dombrowski opinion was interpreted by some to apply the principles of McNeese and Baggett to
state criminal proceedings,40 thus, protecting criminal defendants from
the unnecessary hardship of the actual defense of a criminal prosecution
where their first amendment rights were being restricted.
The Dombrowski opinion defines the detrimental effect of a facially
unconstitutional statute on first amendment freedoms as "the chilling
35.
36.
1968);
37.
38.
39.
40.

Dombrowski, 380 U.S. 479, 486 (1965).
University Committee to End War v. Gunn, 289 F. Supp. 897, 901 (W.D. Tex.
Eberhart v. Massell, 311 F. Supp. 657 (N.D. Ga. 1970).
377 U.S. 360 (1964).
Id.
373 U.S. 668 (1963).
See supra, note 36.
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effect."41 Avoidance of a chilling effect on free exercise of expression
has always been of paramount concern to the federal judiciary. 2 A logical conclusion was that the Dombrowski decision formulated a new test
for federal injunctive relief: a claimant need only show a "chilling effect" on first amendment freedoms in order to secure such federal relief. 4' However, Younger refused to accept this new approach,
and
44
maintained the traditional criteria of showing irreparable injury.
Apart from this language the Dombrowski holding focuses primarily
on the conduct of state authorities; it is at this point that bad faith and
harassment play an important role. In Cameron v. Johnson,45 the
Court dealt exclusively with the bad faith issue. The appellants in
Cameron sought a declaratory judgment and permanent injunctive relief, alleging the state statute regulating picketing to be vague and overbroad. Considering the request for a declaratory judgment first,4 the
Court found that the statute was not void on its face. However, the
Court went on to consider whether the application of the statute by the
state authorities constituted bad faith harassment. Applying the Dombrowski holding, the Court held that the unconstitutionality of the
given statute was irrelevant. 47 The Court considered the conduct of the
authorities and found no "special circumstances" beyond the ordinary
harm that results from every criminal prosecution. The dissent in
Cameron agreed that the statute was in fact, constitutional, but thought
there was a showing of bad faith in its application.4 8
Subsequent lower federal court cases have concentrated most heavily
49
on this element of bad faith and harassment. In Turner v. LaBelle,
four civil rights leaders requested an injunction barring any prosecution under a state statute, alleging vagueness and overbreadth. The
41. Dombrowski, 380 U.S. 479 (1965).
42. A criminal prosecution under a state statute usually involves imponderables
and contingencies that themselves inhibit first amendment freedoms. Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147 (1959).
Because first amendment freedoms need breathing
space to survive, government may regulate in the area with only narrow specificity.
Cf. Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74 (1964); N.A.A.C.P. v. Button, 371 U.S.
415, 433 (1963).
43. The Chilling Effect in Constitutional Law, 69 COL. L. REV. 808 (1969).
Federal Injunctive Relief Against State Court Proceedings: The Significance of Dombrowski, 48 TEXAS L. REV. 578 (1970).
44. See also, Midwest Video Corp. v. Campbell, 250 F. Supp. 158 (D.N.M. 1965);
Penny v. Municipal Court of Cherry Hill, 312 F. Supp. 938 (D.N.J. 1970); Postal
v. Stokes, 430 F.2d 1300 (6th Cir. 1970).
45. 390 U.S. 611 (1968).
46. Zwickler v. Koota, 389 U.S. 241 (1967) authorizes consideration of a request

for injunctive relief separately from a demand for a declaratory judgment.
47.
48.
49.

Cameron v. Johnson, 390 U.S. 611 (1968).
Id. at 619.
251 F. Supp. 443 (D. Conn. 1966).
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court refused to grant relief, stating the statute was subject to one narrowing construction in the state courts, and therefore, the plaintiffs
would have to defend only a single criminal prosecution. The court applied the Dombrowski decision to the facts of the case, finding there
was no seizure of important records or extensive threats of arrests such
as occurred in Dombrowski, hence, no bad faith on the part of state
authorities. In Turner, because the state proceedings had been terminated the Anti-injunction Statute was not a bar to injunctive relief. On
the other hand, in Dameron v. W.E. Harson,5 ° a federal district court
simply applied § 2283 as a bar to federal intervention. With a few notable exceptions,"' lower courts have generally applied Dombrowski narrowly, and have avoided interference with state proceedings. 2
THE

Younger DECISION: A RESTRICTION OF Dombrowski

The majority in Younger, well aware of the national policy against
federal injunction of state court criminal proceedings, was unwilling to
circumvent the Anti-injunction Statute. 53 However, the opinion of the
Court did express the view that there is a judicially created exception to
the policy of non-interference. The thrust of the opinion of the Court
did not rest wholly on the statute, but was directed to the general
principles of equity, comity and federalism. Younger treats the Antiinjunction Statute as a result of surrounding historical factors, rather
than an automatic deterrent to federal judicial discretion. 54
The opinion of the Court reaffirmed the original test for federal injunctive relief, i.e., "great and immediate" irreparable injury, 55 and proceeded to distinguish Dombrowski from the cases preceding it. Emphasizing the extreme circumstances involved in Dombrowski, the opinion concluded that the decision was not a departure from, but rather an
affirmance of, long-standing principles.5 6 That is, due to the bad faith
harassment and threat of multiple prosecutions, the appellant in Dombrowski qualified for injunctive relief under prevailing authority.
50. 251 F. Supp. 533 (W.D. La. 1966).
51. See: P.B.I.C. v. Byrne, 313 F. Supp. 757, 766 (D. Mass. 1970).
52. See: Wallace v. Brewer, 315 F. Supp. 451 (M.D. Ala. 1970); Aler v. Pomerlau,
315 F. Supp. 277 (D. Md. 1970); Alexander v. Thompson, 313 F. Supp. 1389 (C.D.
Cal. 1970).
53. Although a majority of justices did not join in the same opinion, eight justices did agree that the Anti-injunction Statute provided an obstacle to Federal action
in this case.
54. The Court stated: "[A] judicial exception to the longstanding policy evidenced
by the statute has been made ....
." Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 43 (1971).
55. Fenner v. Boykin, 271 U.S. 240 (1926).
56. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 51 (1971).
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The opinion of the Court stated that the district court in Younger
had misinterpreted Dombrowski in holding that federal courts can grant
equitable relief "without regard to any showing of bad faith or harassment, whenever a state statute is found 'on its face' to be vague or overly
broad, in violation of the First Amendment. '57 Although this interpretation appears to be a possible conclusion from the Dombrowski language, the Younger opinion states that the lower court decision was
erroneous. The opinion of the Court reduces the part of the Dombrowski opinion, which discusses the impact of the involvement of first
amendment rights on the anti-injunction policy, to mere dictum, observing that it was unnecessary to the decision in the case. Indeed, the
Dombrowski decision was grounded in the longstanding principles of
Ex Parte Young and Douglas v. City of Jeanette, and therefore, a new
test for federal injunctive relief could be considered unnecessary.
The majority seems to be perfectly satisfied with the test as it was
prior to Dombrowski and unwilling to recognize any change in it. Continuing to reject any contention that only a showing of a chilling effect
is needed to invoke federal jurisdiction, the opinion of the Court states:
"[T]his sort of chilling effect . . . should not by itself justify federal
intervention." '
The implication is clear-the Court is refusing to
sanction any federal intervention without a showing of bad faith harassment by state authorities.
The Court makes a very important observation when referring to the
type of injunctive relief issued in Dombrowski. There, the Court stated
the injunction could be lifted when the statute had been narrowly construed by the state courts, thereby curing it of its overbreadth. The
state could then renew prosecution. 59 However, this type of injunctive
relief does not cure any chilling effect suffered by persons fearing prosecution under a statute.6 0 The only alternative to the type of temporary
injunction issued in Dombrowski is a permanent injunction, but the
latter approach would leave the state virtually helpless to enforce sanctions against conduct clearly illegal.61 Hence, Dombrowski did not cure
the chilling effect with the type of injunctive relief granted.
The opinion of the Court makes short work of the Baggett 62 deci57.

Id. at 50.

58. Id.at 51.
59. The Court stated in Dombrowski: "The state must, if it is to invoke the
statute after injunctive relief has been sought, assume the burden of obtaining a
permissibly narrow construction in a noncriminal proceeding before it may seek modification of the injunction to permit further prosecution." 380 U.S. at 492.
60. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 50 (1971).
61.

62.

Id.

377 U.S. 360 (1964).
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sion by distinguishing the type of harm that the claimant was to suffer." s The Younger case applied its attention exclusively to the criminal proceedings area. By undermining all of the Dombrowski authority, other than the traditional cases,6 4 the majority strengthened the view
that Dombrowski was only a logical extension of those cases.
Younger does not affect the critical part of the Dombrowski holding,
for bad faith remains a key factor. In Hoeland v. Hogan,6" the New
York District Court found there was no bad faith enforcement by state
authorities, and abstained from deciding the constitutionality of an immunity waiver. Failure to sign the immunity waiver, thereby opening
the way for state prosecution, would eliminate the plaintiff from eligibility to sell milk in New York. The plaintiff alleged violation of his rights
against self-incrimination. The Court found that the plaintiffs rights
would be adequately vindicated in the state courts. In another district
court decision, 6 a claimant's allegation that a Tennessee statute was
unconstitutional on its face was rejected. The three judge court refused injunctive relief noting the absence of bad faith, even though the
statute was alleged to be overly broad and vague. The court said that
there must be proof of a systematic plan by state authorities designed
to harass, before bad faith exists. In Brown v. Fallis,6 r on similar facts,
the court refused injunctive relief, finding no bad faith or irreparable
injury. Therefore, lower court support for the Younger analysis of
Dombrowski is prevalent. 68
There is also extensive speculation on the suggestion that the Civil
Rights Act 69 provides a statutory exception to the Anti-injunction Stat63. The Younger majority notes that the claimant in Baggett requested an injunction to prevent him from being discharged from his job because of his failure to swear
to a loyalty oath. In that case there was no danger of criminal prosecution, and
therefore the harm that the claimant in Baggett sought to avoid was clearly different
than the harm endangering Harris. Hence, the Court believes that loss of employment is the type of irreparable harm that will invoke injunctive relief; this is not
always the case when merely one criminal prosecution has begun. 401 U.S. at 50,
n.4 (1971).
64. I.e. Douglas v. City of Jeanette, 319 U.S. 157 (1943) and Ex Parte Young,
209 U.S. 123 (1906).
65. 272 F. Supp. 855 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
66. Brooks v. Briley, 274 F. Supp. 538 (M.D.Tenn. 1967) alf'd, 391 U.S. 361
(1968).
67. 311 F. Supp. 548 (N.D. Okla. 1970).
68. See: Baker v. Binder, 274 F. Supp. 658 (W.D. Kent. 1967), the court required bad faith and an unconstitutional statute before the claimant could qualify for
injunctive relief; see also: Cox v. Louisiana, 348 F.2d 750, 752 (5th Cir. 1965),
there the court demanded a showing of bad faith since the statute was constitutional.
69. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983: "Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be
subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction
thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity,
or other proper proceeding for redress."
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ute, as an "expressly authorized" 70 act of Congress. Dombrowski and
Younger purposely avoided this issue. If in either decision the Court
had held § 1983 to be a valid exception to the Anti-injunction Statute,
the importance of § 2283 in barring injunctions would be nil whenever constitutional rights are at issue. The appropriateness of using
§ 1983 as an exception will be examined in conjunction with Justice
Douglas' dissent.
The reasoning of the Younger majority may be summarized as follows: federal interference in state court criminal proceedings is reserved or those situations where special circumstances can be demonstrated. The special circumstances must take the form of bad faith
and harassment that could result in multiple prosecutions.
FEDERAL APPROACH TO DECLARATORY RELIEF

Samuels v. Mackell,71 a companion decision to Younger discusses
the same general issues of federalism and non-interference. The issue
that was presented in Samuels was whether a federal court should grant
declaratory relief by judging a state statute unconstitutional, when injunctive relief would be improper. The Court applied the same tests in
Samuels that were applied in Younger, stating:
Since in the present case there is . . .no sufficient showing in the
record that the plaintiffs have suffered or would suffer irreparable
damages, our decision
in Younger is dispositive of the prayers for
72
injunctions here.
The Court continued by characterizing a declaratory judgment as an
equitable remedy, and concluded that the standards by which relief in
that form should be granted are judged by the longstanding principles
of equity. Clearly, this is essentially the same approach the Court
took in analyzing the Younger situation. In effect, the declaratory
judgment and the injunction have the same impact on state courts, and
the principles that make injunctive relief improper apply equally to a
declaratory judgment. As the Court states: "The propriety of declaratory and injunctive relief should be judged on essentially the same
73
standards."
The issuance of a declaratory judgment provides a means to avoid
the Anti-injunction Statute. One of the statutory exceptions to § 2283
70.
71.
72.
73.

28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1964).
401 U.S. 66 (1971).
Id. at 68.
Id. at 72.
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is that a federal court may issue an injunction restraining state proceedings to "protect or effectuate" its judgments. Hence, if a statute were
declared unconstitutional, the court could then issue an injunction to
effectuate that judgment. Surely it would seem anomalous to apply
different standards to essentially the same demand. 74 The Samuels decision holds that when a state criminal proceeding has begun, the federal courts should not grant an injunction, nor issue a declaratory judgment, save in cases where extraordinary circumstances similar to those
discussed in Younger exist.
The decision in Samuels do not overrule the decision in Zwickler v.
Koota,7 holding that a federal court should decide requests for injunctions separately from requests for declaratory judgments. However, it appears that Zwickler's importance has been diminished in the
area of criminal prosecutions. The Court in that decision was not confronted with the Anti-injunction Statute since there were no criminal
proceedings yet instituted against the plaintiff. The majority held that
federal courts should refuse relief when state statutes are alleged to be
overbroad, and proscribe conduct protected by the first amendment.
The aim of the Court was to prevent a chilling effect on free speech
while the state courts were construing the challenged statute. Zwickler
and McNeese7 when read together imply that federal courts may decide issues relating to an infringement on free expression, without waiting for the state court interpretation of a given statute. 77 Samuels, on
the other hand, declares that after state proceedings have begun, the interest in allowing state authorities to continue until they have disposed
of the controversy must prevail.
Samuels, however, does refer to a situation where declaratory relief
would be proper while the injunctive remedy would be particularly intrusive or offensive.78 For example, when a federal court wishes to
avoid invalidating an entire statute alleged to be overboard, delay could
be avoided by issuing an authoritative construction clearly within constitutional limits by way of a declaratory judgment. In this manner
the court would avoid a chilling effect on the exercise of free speech
while still enabling the states to pursue the legitimate ends of the statute. Of course, under Samuels the plaintiff must always demonstrate
74. See: Brooks v. Briley, 274 F. Supp. 538 (M.D. Tenn. 1967); but see LeFlore v.

Robinson, 434 F.2d 933 (5th Cir. 1970).
75. 389 U.S. 241 (1967).
76. See p. 143 supra.

77.

Supra, note 41, Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479 (1965).

78.

Samuels v. Mackell, 401 U.S. 66, 73 (1971).
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the requisite "special circumstances" regardless of whether he requests
an injunction or a declaratory judgment.
JUSTICE DOUGLAS' DISSENT:

AN ACTIVIST VIEW

OF NON-INTERFERENCE

Justice Douglas' dissent"9 takes basic issue with the concept of federalism as expressed in the opinion of the Court, and the latter's treatment of Dombrowski. His disagreement lies in a broad and general
area, namely, the role of the federal courts and the national policy of
non-interference. Justice Douglas' opinion relates to these questions:
Is 42 U.S.C. § 198380 an exception to the Anti-injunction Statute; must
there be a showing of bad faith by state authorities before the federal
courts will grant injunctive relief; and should federal authority and
equitable jurisdiction be expanded to protect individual rights in state
court criminal proceedings?
Questioning the treatment of Dombrowski in the opinion of the Court,
Justice Douglas states:
The "special circumstances" when federal intervention in a state
criminal proceeding is permissible are not restricted to bad faith on
the part of state officials or the threat of multiple prosecutions.
They also exist where for any reason the state statute being enforced is unconstitutional on its face.8 1
Hence, Justice Douglas applied the holding in Dombrowski broadly, rejecting the majority's conclusion that the language relating to first
amendment rights was mere dicta. Relying on the premise that federal
courts are unwilling to allow states to infringe on first amendment
freedoms by way of overbroad statutes, Justice Douglas views the role
of the federal courts as that of a protector of these rights."2 Characterizing appellee Harris' conduct as innocent, and pointing out that the
state statute at issue is overbroad, he believes that the injunctive relief
granted was proper.
The case authority supporting Justice Douglas' view that free speech
enjoys a preferred position and that statutes regulating expression are
subject to very narrow construction is extensive.8 3 However, he does
not cite any cases that overrule Douglas v. City of Jeanette, which demands federal non-interference with state criminal proceedings unless
79.
80.
81.

Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 58 (1971).
Set out supra note 69.
Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 59 (1971).

82.

Id.at 58.

83.
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there exist "special circumstances." The dissent treats any infringement on free speech by a state statute, and the requisite "special circumstances," as equivalent.
Justice Douglas' analysis of Dombrowski is not unique. In Gall v.
Lawler,"' a district court, just prior to the Younger decision, granted
a declaratory judgment to a federal plaintiff who requested relief from
an overly broad state statute.8 5 The statute violated first amendment
freedoms, and the court did not require a showing of bad faith. Instead, the court relied in part on Zwickler, stating that when a statute
is not ambiguous the federal court should not abstain, but proceed to
decide the allegation(s) of overbreadth. In Wisconsin Student Association v. Regents of the University of Wisconsin,8 6 the court issued an
injunction restraining threatened prosecution under an unconstitutional
statute 87 without requiring evidence of bad faith.
Justice Douglas' position has been consistent throughout the postDombrowski period. As he stated in his concurring opinion in Mills v.
Alabama:88
[When] first amendment rights are jeopardized by a state prosecution which by its very existence threatens to deter others from
exercising their first amendment rights, a federal court will take
the extraordinary step of enjoining the state prosecution. s9
Even though Justice Douglas has been consistent, he has perhaps
been too general in his approach to the issue. Zwickler and McNeese
permit federal declaratory judgments in the absence of pending state
criminal proceedings, when the statute is alleged to be overly broad, but
Justice Douglas would also include those statutes alleged merely to be
vague. There should be a distinction drawn between these two allegations. If a statute suffers from vagueness, one state proceeding could
give it a permissible construction." ° The same result is not likely when
a statute is overly broad. Hence, federal intervention to protect a defendant in state proceedings may be warranted (to prevent a chilling effect due to delay) when the state statute suffers from overbreadth, but
unwarranted when a statute is merely vague.
84. 322 F. Supp. 1223 (E.D. Wis. 1971).
85. The statute in issue regulated peddlers and transient merchants through
licensing; however, the Chief of Police was given too much discretion in the issuance
of these licenses.
86. 318 F. Supp. 591 (N.D. Wis. 1970).
87. The statute in this case regulated loudspeakers on the campus, but was used
primarily to inhibit free speech.
88. 384 U.S. 214 (1965).
89. Id. at 221.
90. See note 43, supra.
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The most persuasive part of the dissent's argument is its treatment
of the Anti-injunction Statute. Justice Douglas states:
The "anti-injunction" statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2283, is not a bar to a
federal injunction under these circumstances. . . . I hold § 1893
[sic] is included in the "expressly authorized" [Act of Congress]
exception to § 2283. 91
Justice Douglas arrives at this conclusion after categorizing the Antiinjunction Statute as an obsolete outgrowth of Eighteenth Century
American federalism. He views the Civil War and subsequent developments as events which have changed the role of the federal judiciary,
and enlarged federal jurisdiction.
The idea that 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is a statutory exception to the Antiinjunction Statute is an often discussed concept.9 2 Justice Douglas gives
that exception effect because the Anti-injunction Statute, in his view,
has been pre-empted in this situation. As he states:
There is no more good reason for allowing a general statute dealing with federalism passed in the 18th Century to control another
statute also dealing with federalism, passed almost 80 years
later, than to conclude that the
early concepts of federalism were
93
not changed by the Civil War.
In Harrison v. NAACP,a" Justice Douglas stated in his dissent that
there should be no abstention when a state statute is violative of federally protected civil rights. Subsequently the Court took a definitive
step toward including § 1983 as a statutory exception to the Anti-injunction Statute in Monroe v. Pape.95 The Court in Monroe construed
§ 1983, which refers to persons acting under "color of law" to include
state authority misusing its power. Therefore, federal courts have jurisdiction in cases where there are unconstitutional statutes being applied
against defendants in state courts. However, the Supreme Court has
never held § 1983 to be an express exception to the Anti-injunction
Statute, even though federal intervention in state court proceedings has
been permitted when civil rights were at issue.
In a line of cases in the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, it was held
that there was no policy of "comity" when dealing with civil rights.9 6
91.
92.

Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 60, 62 (1971).
See: 34 FORDHAM L. REv. 71; Note, 21 RurrGEns L. REv. 92 (1966); compare,

Note, 74 HARV. L. REV. 726 (1961).

93.
94.

Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 62 (1971).
360 U.S. 167 (1958).

96.

Bush v. Orleans Parish School Board, 194 F. Supp. 182 (E.D. La. 1961);

95. 365 U.S. 167 (1960).

see also: Denton v. Carrolton, 235 F.2d 401 (5th Cir. 1956); Browder v. Gayle, 142
F. Supp. 707 (M.D. Ala. 1956) aff'd per curiam 352 U.S. 903 (1956).
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In these decisions, the unconstitutionality of the statutes at issue and
the bad faith conduct of the state authorities were obvious, and therefore these cases could fit into the "special circumstances" exception to
federal non-interference. In Machesky v. Bizzell,"' the court made a
distinction between public rights and private rights.98 It held:
[W]hen first amendment rights are public the Anti-injunction
statute does not prohibit a federal court from enjoining a vague
and overbroad state court injunction to the extent that it violates
these rights."
Public rights could be compared with federally protected civil rights;
nevertheless, the Supreme Court continues to avoid the question.
The unwillingness of the Court to permit § 1983 to act as an exception to § 2283 reflects fear that it will restrict the state courts and
allow a flood of federal suits on every state prosecution under a regulatory statute. After Dombrowski there was indeed an increase in cases
requesting injunctive relief, and this fear may be well founded. 10 0 The
Younger court sought to restrict Dombrowski, and thus its unwillingness to expand federal action through § 1983 was consistent. Likewise,
Justice Douglas' desire to expand Dombrowski foreshadows his attempt
to include § 1983 as a statutory exception to § 2283.
The theory that § 1983 does not provide an exception to the Anti-injunction Statute has case authority.' 0 ' In Collins v. Hardyman, 2 the
Court said that § 1983 was not intended to centralize the judicial system.
Further, regardless of which theory is adopted, a federal claimant in
order to attain equitable relief will still have to meet the principles of
equity.'
Hence, the discussion of the importance of § 1983 becomes
somewhat academic. A court must continue to require a showing of
"special circumstances" in the form of great and immediate irreparable
injury, inadequacy of legal remedy, and danger of multiple prosecutions. The controversy persists, and the opinion of the Court in
Younger does not answer the objections raised by Justice Douglas.
97. 414 F.2d 283 (5th Cir. 1969).
98. This apparent distinction between public and private rights was not clearly
delineated by the court, but public rights are loosely comparable to federally protected civil rights. The court cites voting, political organizations, or any other right
relating to an individual's political power as public rights.
99. Id. at 291. This decision dealt with a state court injunction that suffered
from overbreadth rather than a state statute.
100. Seddler, The Dombrowski-type of Suit as an Effective Weapon for Social
Change: Reflections from Without and Within, 18 KAN. L. REV. 237 (1970).

101.
102.
103.

E.g. Baines v. City of Danville, 337 F.2d 579 (4th Cir. 1964).
341 U.S. 651 (1950).
See generally: Note, 69 COLUM. L. REV. 808 (1969).
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CONCLUSION

The Younger decision insures state authority in the area of criminal
proceedings with a minimum amount of federal interference. The possible inroads to federal injunctive relief provided by the Dombrowski
decision have diminished. A federal claimant must now show more
than a "chilling effect" on his first amendment freedoms to gain an injunction: he must allege and prove "special circumstances" in the nature of bad faith by state authorities. The bad faith may take the form
of flagrant harassment or threats of multiple prosecution, but there must
be more than a mere allegation of an overly broad statute to enlist federal assistance. In short, Younger reaffirms the longstanding doctrine
of non-interference by federal courts in state criminal proceedings
absent a showing of great and immediate injury to a defendant. The
Dombrowski decision is restricted, but not overruled. The Younger
Court emphasizes the fact that Dombrowski was not a departure from
the case authority and the traditional approach to the federal policy of
non-interference.
The role of § 2283 as an effective bar to federal injunctive relief in
the area of state criminal proceedings is doubtful. Although the Court
has not yet ruled on the proposal to include § 1983 as a statutory exception to § 2283, there is an emphasis on the judicial exception' 014 to
the Anti-injunction Statute. The Court's approach to § 2283 suggests
that the statute is merely a reflection of federalism and comity, and can
be easily circumvented by the Court when special circumstances exist.
The Younger decision is a reversal of federal activism. The Younger
Court has enunciated a policy of permitting intervention only in cases
of flagrant state abuse of civil rights, remaining unwilling to invoke its
equitable power absent extraordinary conditions. The changing
makeup of the Supreme Court suggests that perhaps this trend may
continue.
ROBERT W.

104.

SHEPPY

See the discussion of the judicial exception beginning on p. 139 supra.

